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Symposium Article

The Incompleteness of the Model
Rules and the Development of
Professional Standards
by Nathan M. Crystal*
Rules and standards of professional conduct are proliferating. In
November 2000, the American Bar Association's ("ABA's") Ethics 2000
Commission released its final report recommending changes in the
ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct.' Earlier in the year the
American Law Institute ("ALI") issued its long awaited Restatement of
the Law Governing Lawyers. 2
The Model Rules and the Restatement are similar in two respects.
Both contain detailed rules and both are comprehensive, covering
*
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1. Center for Professional Responsibility, Ethics 2000 Commission, November 2000
Report (visited February 19, 2001) <http://www.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-whole-reporthome.
html>.
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relationships between lawyers and their clients, the courts, and third
parties. Standards prepared by other organizations, however, have
taken a narrower approach. Some have focused on particular activities
performed by lawyers. In 1994 the American College of Trial Lawyers
issued a revision of its Code of Trial Conduct.3 In 1998 the ABA Section
of Litigation issued Guidelines for Litigation Conduct4 and is now
developing standards for settlement negotiations. 5
Other organizations have focused on specialized areas of practice. In
1992 the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers developed
standards to guide family law practitioners,' followed, in 1995, by
standards for attorneys and guardians in custody and visitation
proceedings. 7 The American College of Trust and Estate Counsel has
prepared commentaries on the Model Rules.' In the area of criminal
practice, the ABA has issued Standards for the Prosecution and the
Defense. 9
Another aspect of the standards movement is the emphasis on
professionalism. In 1988 the ABA House of Delegates recommended that
state and local bar associations "encourage their members to accept as
a guide for their individual conduct, and to comply with, a lawyers' creed
of professionalism."' ° Many state and local bar associations have also
adopted creeds or codes of professionalism."
What is one to make of this plethora of standards? Do they represent
simply a hodgepodge of issuances by different organizations, each with
its own views on lawyers' ethics, or is there some pattern to these
efforts? Because the production of standards seems to be increasing,

3.

American College of Trial Lawyers, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT, 156 F.R.D. 275 (1994)

(1994 revision of code originally issued in 1956).
4. ABA Section of Litigation, Guidelines for Conduct (visited February 19, 2001)
<http'/www.abanet.org/litigation/litnews/practice/guidelines.html>.
5. ABA Section of Litigation, Ethical Guidelinesfor Settlement Negotiations (Draft Feb.
2001).
6. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, The Bounds of Advocacy, 9 J. AM.
ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAw. 1 (1992).

7. American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, Representing Children:Standardsfor
Attorneys and GuardianAd Litems in Custody or Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 1 (1995).

8. American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, Commentaries on the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (3d ed. 1999) (visited February 21, 2001) <http://www.actec.org/
publnfoArk/comm/toc.html>.
9.
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how are we to evaluate each newly introduced set of standards? Are
there any general principles that organizations should take into account
in preparing standards?
Part I of this Article argues that the standards movement can be
understood by focusing on the characteristics of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, the basic source of lawyers' ethical obligations.
The drafters of the Model Rules created a document that has significant
limitations and, as a result, cannot serve as a comprehensive statement
of lawyers' obligations. The various standards produced by other
organizations respond to one or more of the limitations of the Model
Rules.
Part II considers the evaluation of these other standards. Because the
Model Rules are regulatory while other standards are voluntary, it is
possible to derive several principles that can guide the work of standards
drafters. First, standards should be consistent with the Model Rules
unless there are strong reasons to deviate from the Model Rules and
clear warnings of the deviation are given. Second, standards should
provide detailed supplementation rather than mere repetition of the
Model Rules. Third, drafters should develop an action plan to make
voluntary standards influential.
I.

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MODEL RULES AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF STANDARDS

The ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct in 1983 to replace the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Model Rules have a number of characteristics that make them an
incomplete source for determining a lawyer's ethical obligations.
However, the word "incomplete" is not intended as a criticism of the
Model Rules. It would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
prepare a complete statement of lawyers' obligations. Nonetheless, by
focusing on the ways in which the Model Rules are incomplete, we can
begin to understand the function performed by other standards.
First, the Model Rules are intended principally as a statement of
rules, the violation of which can lead to professional discipline. The
Rules state: "Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition
imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process." 2
There are, of course, exceptions. Not all of the rules have a disciplinary
function. Some use the term "may" and thus provide lawyers with
professional discretion. Sometimes lawyers have very broad discretion
that is unrestricted by a standard. In other situations lawyers have

12.
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weaker discretion restricted or "grounded" in a general standard.1
Among the many discretionary decisions that lawyers face are the
following: the decision to undertake representation, determination of
whether a conflict of interest exists, the scope of counseling clients about
nonlegal matters, choice of tactics and presentation of evidence, public
comments about pending proceedings, dealing with clients who suffer
from diminished capacity, disclosure of confidential information to
prevent client wrongdoing, permissive withdrawal from representation,
extent of pro bono service, methods of billing, and advertising of legal
services. 14

Other rules are descriptive of the professional relationship. For
example, Model Rule 1.13(a) provides that a lawyer retained or employed
by an organization represents the entity rather than any of its constituents. 5 Despite these qualifications, the Model Rules are primarily a
disciplinary code. As a disciplinary code, the Model Rules eschew
aspirational statements. Indeed, the history of the Model Rules shows
that the drafters intended to largely eliminate aspirational concepts.
The Code of Professional Responsibility preceded the Model Rules.
The Code had a three-part structure comprised of canons, disciplinary
rules (DRs), and ethical considerations (ECs), that differed significantly
from the Model Rules. The Code's drafters intended the canons to serve
as axioms of lawyers' obligations. For example, Canon 4 stated: "A
lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client."" The
disciplinary rules were more detailed black letter statements of
minimum standards, the violation of which could be the basis of
professional discipline. By contrast, the ethical considerations served as
both commentary on the disciplinary rules and aspirational norms that
lawyers should strive to achieve, but the violation of which would not be
the basis of discipline. 7
Soon after its adoption, the Code of Professional Responsibility was
subjected to substantial criticism. One of the objections to the Code was
that the division into canons, ethical considerations, and disciplinary

13. See Bruce A. Green, The Role of Personal Values in ProfessionalDecisionmaking,
11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 19, 39 (1997) (drawing distinction between restricted and
grounded discretion).
14. For a discussion of discretion under the Model Rules, see Nathan M. Crystal,
Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POLy 75
(2000); see also 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 1.24 (3d ed. 2001).
15. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.13(a).
16.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 4 (1980).

17. Id. Preliminary Statement.
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rules was complex and confusing.' 8 The drafters of the Model Rules
abandoned the structure of the Code and adopted a simpler framework
of black letter rules followed by comments, much like the Restatements.
In the process they eliminated the aspirational aspects of the Code. As
a result the Model Rules have a certain lifelessness to them. To say that
they are devoid of spirit would perhaps go too far, but reading the Model
Rules is unlikely to be inspirational.
Second, the Model Rules are intended to apply to lawyers generally
rather than to attorneys who practice in particular fields of law. The
Model Rules are grouped under eight sections: (1) client-lawyer
relationship; (2) counselor; (3) advocate; (4) transactions with persons
other than clients; (5) law firms and associations; (6) public service; (7)
information about legal services; and (8) maintaining the integrity of the
profession. These sections do not deal with areas of specialization. As
one thumbs through the rules, it is rare to encounter provisions that
deal with particular areas of practice. Rule 1.11 deals with lawyers
entering or leaving government practice 9 and Rule 3.8 deals with the
special responsibilities of prosecutors, but they are the exceptions.20
Again, no criticism is meant by this observation. The drafters of the
Model Rules had no choice. Despite vast differences in the practice of
law, the legal profession is still unified in the sense that the same
standards for admission and discipline apply to all attorneys. A set of
rules that attempted to take into account the nuances of various areas
of practice would be extremely difficult to produce, unwieldy in length,
and of necessity contain much information that most lawyers would find
irrelevant.
Third, the Model Rules often refer lawyers to "other law" for directions
on how they should act. Many rules make specific references to general
law. For example, Rule 3.4(b) states that a lawyer shall not "offer an
inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law."21 Similarly, Rule
3.4(d) provides that a lawyer shall "make reasonably diligent effort to
22
comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party."
Likewise, Rule 3.5 directs lawyers not to influence or communicate with
judges, jurors, or prospective jurors except to the extent permitted by
law.23 Rule 4.2 allows a lawyer to communicate with a represented

18.

HAZARD & HODES, supra note 14, § 1.11, at 1-20.

19.

MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.11.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Id. Rule
Id. Rule
Id. Rule
Id. Rule

3.8.
3.4(b).
3.4(d).
3.5.
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person when "authorized by law."24 More generally, the Model Rules
assume the applicability of background legal principles: "The Rules
presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context
includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws
defining specific 25obligations of lawyers and substantive and procedural
law in general."
To summarize, the Model Rules are an incomplete source of professional obligations because they contain disciplinary rules rather than
aspirational guidance, focus on general duties rather than the obligations of lawyers in particular areas of practice, and refer lawyers to
"other law" to determine many of their obligations. The various
standards offered by different organizations can be understood as
responding to one or more of these limitations of the Model Rules.
The first way in which the Model Rules are incomplete is their focus
on disciplinary rules rather than aspirational standards. The professionalism movement in broad terms responds to this absence in the Model
Rules.
The origins of the professionalism movement are usually traced to the
Stanley Commission Report, adopted by the ABA in 1986.26 The report,
issued three years after the adoption of the Model Rules, noted the
movement away from aspirational standards:
The transition from the Canons to the Code to the Model Rules was
paralleled by the development of disciplinary enforcement machinery
in the several states. As a consequence, lawyers have tended to take
the rules more seriously because of an increased fear of disciplinary
prosecutions and malpractice suits. However, lawyers have also tended
to look at nothing but the rules; if conduct meets the minimum
standard, lawyers tend to ignore exhortations to set their standards at
a higher level.27
The recommendations of the Stanley Commission included the resolution
"to abide by higher standards of conduct than the minimum required by
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct."2" The Stanley Commission noted:
Surely, it is not too much to call on the American Bar Association
and its members to reach for such a goal. The minimum standards are

24. Id. Rule 4.2.
25. Id. Preamble, Scope & Terminology.
26. ABA Comm'n on Professionalism,'... In the Spirit of PublicService': A Blueprint
for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243 (1986).
27. Id. at 259.

28. Id. at 296.
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important, indeed essential, to uphold; but leadership, example and
inspiration are needed as well. We call on the American Bar Association to provide the leadership and the example, which in turn will
provide the inspiration.29
The tone of professionalism codes produced in later years is strikingly
different from the Model Rules. For example, the Lawyer's Creed of
Professionalism begins with the following preamble, emphasizing the
difference between the Creed and the rules of professional conduct:
As a lawyer I must strive to make our system of justice work fairly and
efficiently. In order to carry out that responsibility, not only will I
comply with the letter and spirit of the disciplinary standards
applicable to all lawyers, but I will also conduct myself in accordance
with the following Creed of Professionalism when dealing with my
client, opposing parties, their counsel, the courts and the general
public.3"
Specific provisions of the Creed carry out this high-toned approach.
I will advise my client that civility and courtesy are not to be
equated with weakness; ....
In business transactions I will not quarrel over matters of form or
style, but will concentrate on matters of substance and content; ....
I will be a vigorous and zealous advocate on behalf of my client,
while recognizing, as an officer of the court, that excessive zeal may be
detrimental to my client's interests as well as to the proper functioning
of our system of justice; ....

I will remember that, in addition to commitment to my client's cause,
my responsibilities as a lawyer include a devotion to the public good.3'
Similarly, the Lawyer's Pledge of Professionalism that was adopted by
the Younger Lawyers Section of the ABA and approved by the House of
Delegates in 1988 for dissemination to the profession, offers a broad
vision of the role and responsibilities of lawyers:
1. I will remember that the practice of law is first and foremost a
profession, and I will subordinate business concerns to professionalism
concerns.
2. I will encourage respect for the law and our legal system through my
words and actions.
3. I will remember my responsibilities to serve as an officer of the court
and protector of individual rights.

29. Id. at 296-97.
30. ABA/BNA, supra note 10, 1:401.
31. Id. 1:401.02.
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4. I will contribute time and resources to public service, public

education, charitable, and pro bono activities in my community.
5. I will work with the other participants in the legal system, including
judges, opposing counsel and those whose practices are different from
mine, to make our legal system more accessible and responsive.
6. I will resolve matters expeditiously and without unnecessary
expense.
7. I will resolve disputes through negotiation whenever possible.
8. I will keep my clients well-informed and involved in making the
decisions that affect them.
9. I will continue to expand my knowledge of the law.
10. I will achieve and maintain proficiency in my practice.
11. I will be courteous to those with whom I come into contact during
the course of my work.
12. I will honor the spirit and intent, as well as the requirements, of
the applicable rules or code of professional conduct for my jurisdiction,
and I will encourage others to do the same. 2
Thus, the professionalism codes fundamentally represent a response to
the absence of an aspirational or spiritual component to the Model
Rules. Indeed, the leading critic of the professionalism movement, Rob
Atkinson, has drawn a parallel between the movement and religious
crusades.33
The second way in which the Model Rules are incomplete is they
largely ignore the ethical problems posed by particular areas of practice.
Traditionally, lawyers have been generalists who are available to handle
any kind of legal matter. That is no longer the case. The Stanley
Commission noted this change:
[T]he practice of law has now broken down into informal specialties
more than at any earlier time. There is simply too much to know for all
aspects of law to be practiced by everyone. Tax lawyers, probate
lawyers, litigators, energy specialists and family lawyers only begin to
suggest the diversity. These divisions are informal in most states, but
they are real. Even lawyers in general practice do not do everything;
at most, they handle matters in several areas of law and refer the rest
to others. One implication of these divisions for the Bar generally is
that lawyers may feel they have more in common with practitioners in
their substantive areas than with the Bar as a whole.34

32. ABA/BNA, supra note 10, 1:403.
33. Rob Atkinson, A Dissenter's Commentary on the ProfessionalismCrusade, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 259, 270 (1995).
34. 112 F.R.D. at 252-53; see also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Changing Structures in the
Practice of Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 167, 167-68 (2000).
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Suppose a tax lawyer wants to know her obligations in drafting an
opinion regarding a tax shelter. Model Rule 2.3 specifies when a lawyer
may evaluate a matter for a client to be used by a third person, but it
provides no standards for that evaluation.35 Instead, tax lawyers must
turn to regulations issued by the IRS to determine their obligations."
Similarly, a lawyer who represents a child finds little guidance in Model
Rule 1.14 on his ethical obligations. The reality of specialization in the
practice of law, coupled with the generality of the Model Rules, produces
a need for standards that deal with the specific problems of lawyers
practicing in particular speciality areas. Much of the standards
production work has taken this direction. The Bounds of Advocacy,
produced by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers; Commentaries on the Model Rules, produced by the American College of Trust
and Estate Counsel; Standards for the Prosecution and Defense
Function, prepared by the ABA; and many other sets of standards
respond to this incompleteness in the Model Rules.
Finally, the Model Rules are incomplete because they assume and
often incorporate reference to other law. The Restatement (Third) of the
Law Governing Lawyers, published by the American Law Institute last
year, represents an effort to deal with the legal incompleteness of the
Model Rules. To some extent the Restatement is successful in this
endeavor. It deals with a number of topics not covered in the Model
Rules: lawyer civil liability," the attorney-client privilege,3" and the
work product doctrine.39
In several respects, however, the Restatement fails in dealing with the
legal incompleteness of the Model Rules. The Restatement is itself
incomplete. For example, notably absent from the Restatement is any
coverage of issues involving advertising and solicitation. To be sure,
there are ethics rules already dealing with these topics, but the force
behind change in the rules dealing with advertising and solicitation has
come from Supreme Court decisions providing lawyers with First
Amendment protection for various forms of commercial speech.4"
The Restatement frequently covers the same topics as the Model Rules
but often stakes out a position that is quite different from the Model
Rules. For example, the Restatement deals not only with the attorney-

35.
36.
37.

MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 2.3.
31 C.F.R. § 10.33 (2000).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, ch. 4.

38. Id. ch. 5, topic 2.
39. Id. ch. 5, topic 3.
40. For a review of these developments, see NATHAN M.

CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION 445-59 (2d ed. 2000).
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client privilege and the work product doctrine, but also with the ethical
duty of confidentiality. 4'
The Restatement, however, authorizes
lawyers to disclose confidential information in a number of situations in
which the Model Rules mandate confidentiality. Restatement section
66(1) allows lawyers to disclose confidential information "when the
lawyer reasonably believes that its use or disclosure is necessary to
prevent reasonably certain death or serious bodily harm to a person."42
The Model Rules only allow disclosure "to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary ... to prevent the client from committing
a criminal act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent
death or substantial bodily harm."4" In section 67, the Restatement
authorizes lawyers to reveal confidential information to prevent,
mitigate, or rectify substantial financial loss in a number of situations.44 The Model Rules prohibit disclosure of confidential information
in these situations.45
Restatement section 124 sometimes allows
screening to prevent disqualification of an entire firm when a member
of the firm is personally disqualified from representation of a client.46
Under the Model Rules, screening is not allowed except in the case of
former government lawyers.47 The drafters of the Restatement decided
to include coverage of matters already dealt with in the Model Rules to
clarify issues that had arisen under the Model Rules and also to promote
change in the Model Rules.4" Finally, the Restatement, like the Model
Rules, often refers to "other law" for resolution of an issue, thus
continuing the same legal incompleteness found in the Model Rules.49

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, ch. 5, topic 1.
Id. § 66(1).
MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.6(b)(1) (emphasis added).
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 67(2).
See MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.6.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 124.
Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rules 1.10 and 1.11. On the rejection of

screening in the Model Rules see Crystal, supra note 40, at 304-07; see also HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 14, § 14.8.
48. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, Foreword:
In many instances, however, the Restatement significantly departs from the
code formulations.
These departures are carefully considered and were
extensively debated. As those of us involved in the drafting of the codes will
testify, many of these departures simply clarify the intendment of the code
provisions and others seek to supersede drafting mistakes. Other departures
reflect recognition that experience with the codes revealed that better resolutions
were to be had on a variety of issues.
Id.
49.

See, e.g. id. §§ 105, 115.
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This is not the place to present a detailed criticism of the Restatement.
In fact, many of the Restatement sections, particularly the ones
expanding exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, seem justified. The
analysis here is empirical and analytical-to place the Restatement
within the broader framework of the standards movement and to show
how the Restatement and other standards respond to ways in which the
Model Rules are incomplete.

II.

STANDARDS FOR STANDARDS DRAFTERS

There is one striking contrast between the Model Rules and all of the
other standards issued by professional organizations. The Model Rules
are intended to be adopted as law by state supreme courts and to
regulate the practice of law by providing a basis for professional
discipline. All of the other standards are not intended to be adopted as
law. They are intended to operate by persuasion and influence rather
than regulation. The voluntary, nonregulatory character of these
standards has important implications for both the substance of the
standards and the procedure for implementation of the standards. I
offer three principles for standards drafters: (1) Draft standards that
are consistent with the Model Rules unless strong reasons justify a
departure from the Model Rules and the standards give clear warning
of the change; (2) provide detailed supplementation rather than mere
repetition of the Model Rules; and (3) develop an action plan to make the
standards influential.
A. Standards Should Generally Be Consistent with the Model Rules
Unless SubstantialReasons Justify the Deviation and the Standards
Give Clear Warning of the Departurefrom the Model Rules
Because violation of a rule of professional conduct is a basis for
discipline in all jurisdictions, drafters of standards must take care that
their standards are consistent with the Model Rules. Normally,
standard drafters will accept the Model Rules as the basis for their
analysis, but sometimes standard drafters in particular areas of practice
may disagree with the approach of the Model Rules or may attempt to
validate a practice that varies from the Model Rules. If drafters propose
a standard that deviates from the Model Rules, they should warn
practitioners of the substantial risks of this approach.
An example of the problem of consistency with the Model Rules can be
found in the Commentaries on the Model Rules adopted by the American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel ("ACTEC").5 ° Under the Model

50. American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, supra note 8, MPRC Rule 1.6.
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Rules, when a lawyer is asked to represent clients in a single matter and
those clients have potentially differing interests, the lawyer may proceed
with the representation if the lawyer reasonably believes that he can do
so and if both clients consent after consultation, which includes an
explanation of the "implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved." 5 In estate planning for husband and
wife, some practitioners believe that it is proper for a lawyer to
represent the spouses either separately or jointly. 2 In separate
representation, the lawyer represents each spouse separately as to that
spouse's rights and interests.5 3 Further, in separate representation, the
lawyer must maintain the confidentiality of information received from
either spouse, even if the information might affect the estate plan of the
other spouse.54 The lawyer, however, may have a duty to withdraw if
the receipt of confidential information means that an actual conflict of
interest exists between the spouses.55 By contrast, in joint representation the lawyer represents both spouses "joined to accomplish a mutual
goal."5" If a lawyer who is engaged in joint representation receives
confidential information from one spouse that has an impact on the
estate plan of the other spouse, the lawyer must act as a fiduciary to
both spouses and must choose to disclose, to maintain confidentiality, or
to withdraw based on the lawyer's determination of which action does
the least harm.5 7
Nothing in the rules of professional conduct authorizes lawyers to
represent multiple clients while keeping information obtained from one
secret from the other. Indeed, the essence of multiple representation is
full disclosure in an effort to reach common objectives or to resolve
differences between the parties. Professor Geoffrey Hazard has criticized
probate and estate lawyers for claiming that their practice should be
subject to special rules.5" He argues that while joint representation is
consistent with the Model Rules, separate representation is "incorrect as
a matter of law and therefore a legally dangerous mode of practice."59

51. MODEL RULES, supra note 12, Rule 1.7(b)(2).
52. Special Study Committee on Professional Responsibility, Comments and
Recommendations on the Lawyer's Duties in Representing Husband and Wife, 28 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 771-72 (1994).
53. Id. at 772.
54. Id. at 796.
55. Id. at 794-95.
56. Id. at 771.
57. Id. at 787.
58. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Conflict of Interest in Estate Planning for Husband and
Wife, 20 PROB. LAW. 1, 6 (1994).

59. Id.
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The Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, while not rejecting the
concept of separate representation outright, refers to it as "novel" and
cautions lawyers about the substantial risks involved in undertaking
this form of representation:
The risks of conflict and subsequent claims for malpractice are
obviously substantial, and any lawyer considering this novel form of
representation presumably would fully inform clients of its risks. At
least at this point, the advice should include informing the clients that
the structure is untried and might have adverse consequences
unintended by the lawyer or clients.6"
Despite these warnings, the ACTEC Commentaries appear to validate
the use of separate representation, although expressing caution about
the approach. The comment to Rule 1.6 states:
There does not appear to be any authority that expressly authorizes a
lawyer to represent multiple clients separately with respect to related
legal matters. However, with full disclosure and the consent of the
clients some experienced estate planners regularly undertake to
represent husbands and wives as separate clients. Similarly, but with
less frequency, some estate planners also represent a parent and child
or other multiple clients as separate clients. A lawyer who is asked to
provide separate representation to multiple clients should do so with
great care because of the stress it necessarily places on the lawyer's
duties of impartiality and loyalty and the extent to which it may limit
the lawyer's ability to advise each of the clients adequately. For
example, without disclosing a confidence of one spouse the lawyer may
be unable adequately to represent the other spouse. However, within
the limits of MRPC 1.7 (Conflict of Interest: General Rule), it may be
possible to provide separate representation regarding related matters
to adequately informed clients who give their consent to the terms of
the representation. It is unclear whether separate representation could
be provided within the scope of MRPC 2.2 (Intermediary). The lawyer's
disclosures to, and the agreement of, clients who wish to be separately
represented should, but need not, be reflected in a contemporaneous
writing. Unless required by local law, such a writing need not be
signed by the clients.61
Sometimes standards drafters may take the opposite approach,
adopting a standard that is more restrictive than the Model Rules. The
American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers took this approach in
connection with the representation of husband and wife. Standard 2.20
states: "An attorney should not represent both husband and wife even

60. RESTATEMENT, supra note 2, § 130 cmt. c, Reporter's note.
61. American College of Trust and Estate Counsel, supra note 8, MRPC 1.6.
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if they do not wish to obtain independent representation." 2 Under the
Model Rules a lawyer may act as an intermediary between husband and
wife, but the comments to Standard 2.20 reject this approach:
Serving as an intermediary between husband and wife is not prohibited
by the RPC [Rules of Professional Conduct]. However, it is impossible
for the attorney to provide impartial advice to both parties, and even
a seemingly amicable separation or divorce may result in bitter
litigation over financial matters or custody.63
B. Standards Should Provide Detailed Supplementation Not
Repetition of the Model Rules
While standards drafters must generally be consistent with the Model
Rules, mere repetition of the Model Rules is not helpful to lawyers.
Thus, standards drafters should strive to supplement the Model Rules
in ways that provide assistance to lawyers in the particular practice area
or lawyering activity with which the drafters are dealing. To provide
such assistance, standards drafters must first determine the problematic
areas or issues they wish to address. Formal or informal surveys of
membership to identify problem areas can provide focus to the work of
drafters. Having identified issues worthy of treatment, drafters can then
provide commentary and illustrations that focus on these problem areas
and offer guidance to practitioners. When significant professional
differences exist and a clear answer is not possible, the drafters can
summarize the differing views with the arguments in favor of each
position. Drafters could also offer their view on what they believe to be
the preferred approach. Specificity and detail rather than generality
should be the guide posts for standards drafters.
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit in developing its standards
of conduct provides a good example of how standards drafters can be
helpful to lawyers by providing detailed guidance. In 1989 the Chief
Judge of the Seventh Circuit appointed a nine-member committee on
civility, chaired by District Judge Marvin E. Aspen. 4 During the next
eighteen months, the committee conducted a study of the issue of civility.
In addition to a review and analysis of the relevant literature, the
committee "conducted an informal survey via a four-page questionnaire
distributed to circuit, district, bankruptcy and magistrate judges; to
more than 1500 lawyer-members of The Seventh Circuit Bar Association
62.
63.
64.
F.R.D.
(1992).

American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers, supra note 6, at 25.
Id. at 25-26.
Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, Interim Report, 143
371 (1992). The Final Report of the Committee can be found at 143 F.R.D. 441
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practicing in Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin; and to members of other
bar associations within the Circuit."65 The survey asked respondents
to identify particular sources of civility problems. The committee then
evaluated both statistical and impressionistic results of the survey. It
concluded that the problem of lack of civility had many causes and that
no simple solution was possible. It recommended standards of conduct
for the Seventh Circuit as part of an overall approach. The standards
were intended to be used for educational purposes, for the guidance of
lawyers, and to express the commitment of judges. They were not
intended to be used as the basis of sanctions because the committee
found widespread dissatisfaction with the imposition of sanctions as a
method for dealing with lack of civility.66
The Seventh Circuit accepted the recommendations of the committee
and adopted Standards for Professional Conduct.67 The standards are
divided into three sections: (1) lawyers' duties to other counsel; (2)
lawyers' duties to the court; and (3) courts' duties to lawyers. While the
standards certainly express an approach to lawyering that goes beyond
adherence to disciplinary rules, they are not filled with platitudes.
Instead, they have a level of detail that can both guide and influence the
behavior of lawyers and judges. For example, under the section on
lawyers' duties to other counsel are thirty standards, including the
following:
6. We will adhere to all express promises and to agreements with other
counsel, whether oral or in writing, and will adhere in good faith to all
agreements implied by the circumstances or local customs.
17. We will agree to reasonable requests for extensions of time and for
waiver of procedural formalities, provided our clients' legitimate rights
will not be materially or adversely affected.
20. We will not engage in any conduct during a deposition that would
not be appropriate in the presence of a judge.
26. We will respond to interrogatories reasonably and will not strain
to interpret them in an artificially restrictive manner to avoid
disclosure of relevant and non-privileged information."

65. 143 F.R.D. at 374.
66. Id. at 409-10.
67. Standards for Professional Conduct Within the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit
(visited February 28, 2001) <http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/conduct.pdf>.

68. Id. at 1-3.
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By contrast to the Seventh Circuit Standards, the American College of
Trial Lawyers Code of Conduct is less satisfactory as a set of standards69 because many of the provisions duplicate the Model Rules.
C. Drafters Should Develop an Action Plan for Making Their
Standards Influential
Because standards, unlike the Model Rules, are voluntary rather than
binding, standards drafters must consider how to make their work
influential. Many approaches are possible. First, to the extent
standards are drafted by membership organizations, members can be
required to adhere to or sign pledges of compliance with the standards
as a condition of membership. Second, standards drafters could
approach law firms and seek to convince their leaders to adopt standards
as guides for conduct within the firm. ° Third, drafters could prepare
teaching materials for law schools based on their standards. Fourth,
preparers can sponsor seminars and other educational programs in
which their standards are disseminated and discussed. Finally, to the
extent that standards are adopted by courts, they can exert enormous
influence over lawyers even when the standards are not enforced
through a regulatory process. Again, the Seventh Circuit standards
stand out as an example. While the standards specifically state that
they are not to be used as a basis for sanctions, their adoption by the
Seventh Circuit places the prestige of the court behind the standards.
III.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental source of lawyers' professional obligations are the

rules of professional conduct adopted by courts in each jurisdiction. In
the vast majority of jurisdictions, these rules are based on the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The Model Rules are, however,
incomplete in three important respects: They establish rules for
discipline of lawyers but largely ignore the aspirations of the profession
of law. They focus on general principles, ignoring the problems of
particular areas of practice. They assume and often incorporate by
reference legal principles. The diverse movement to develop standards
of professional conduct, sponsored by many organizations, extending over
many decades, and continuing to grow in scope, responds to the three
ways in which the Model Rules are incomplete. By considering the

69. <http://www.actl.com/home/publications-by-date/code_ofLtrial_conduct/code-of_
trialconduct.html> (visited February 28, 2001).
70. Bruce A. Green, PublicDeclarationsof Professionalism,52 S.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Spring 2001).
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relationship between standards and the Model Rules, drafters of
standards can gain insights to guide their work.
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